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ABSTRACT
The disclosure of conﬁdential patient data without an individual’s explicit consent
should be for purposes that persons have reason to both expect and accept. We do not
currently have the required level of clarity or consistency in understanding regarding the
disclosure of conﬁdential patient information for public health purposes to support effect-
ive public dialogue. The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002
establish a legal basis in England and Wales for data to be disclosed for public health pur-
poses without patient consent. Under the Regulations, there is more than one potential
route towards lawful processing: Data may be processed for public health purposes under
both Regulations 3 and 5. The alternatives have different safeguards and conditions
attached, and their respective applicability to processing for purposes of public health
improvement is currently unclear and subject to review. Beyond the need for clarity regard-
ing the safeguards applicable to processing for particular public health purposes, there are
reasons to prefer recognition that Regulation 5 is the most appropriate legal basis for dis-
closure when the purpose is public health improvement rather than public health protec-
tion. Where health improvement, rather than protection, is the aim, there is no justiﬁcation
for discarding the additional safeguards associated with processing under Regulation 5.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The analysis of routinely gathered health-care data at a population level, linked with
other digital data, can provide tremendous opportunities to better understand, and
improve, public health. As more data are routinely gathered by health-care providers,
and the technical possibilities regarding the processing, linkage, and analysis of that
data improve and cheapen, there is growing potential for public beneﬁt beyond
improvement to an individual’s direct care. This potential will only be realised if the
necessary data can ﬂow to persons who do not need it to deliver individual care and
treatment. However, any use of individual health-care records for purposes beyond
direct patient care, including for public health purposes, must be done with great care.1
There is already a ‘data deﬁcit’ in the trust that individuals have in institutions, which
consistently dips when individuals are asked about conﬁdence that personal data will be
used appropriately.2 In these circumstances, conﬁdential health data should only ﬂow
for purposes beyond direct care that the public have both reason to expect and also
reason to accept as appropriate. Assurance on appropriate use must be provided
through proportionate and transparent safeguards and controls.3 However, in England
and Wales, the Caldicott2 report last year identiﬁed ‘a lack of coherence in regulations
across the public health arena’4 and called for greater clarity regarding the legal bases for
the disclosure of conﬁdential patient information for particular public health purposes,
including speciﬁcally those outside health protection and cancer registration.
If public trust in the conﬁdentiality of the health record is lost, and any conﬁdence
that sensitive health information is only to be used appropriately is undermined, then
there is a concern that patients will not be candid with health-care professionals.5
Maintaining conﬁdence that data will only be used in appropriate ways—ensuring ‘no
surprises’6—requires an ongoing dialogue with members of the public about the
terms upon which conﬁdential data are used. Such a dialogue urgently requires clarity
regarding the relevant legal bases of disclosure. Without a uniform understanding
1 We have seen the response to proposals to require GPs to disclose patient records to the Health and Social
Care Information Centre so that they might be linked with other health-care records for various secondary
purposes. For discussion of the care.data programme see M Taylor, ‘Information Governance as a Force
for Good? Lessons to be Learnt from Care.data’, (2014) 11(1) SCRIPTed 1 <http://script-ed.org/?
p=1377>.
2 Ipsos Mori, Public Attitudes to the Use and Sharing of Their Data. (July 2014, Research for the Royal Statistical
Society by Ipsos Mori). <http://www.statslife.org.uk/ﬁles/perceptions_of_data_privacy_charts_slides.pdf>;
Davidson, McLean, Treanor, Aitken, Cunningham-Burley, Laurie, Pagliari, and Sethi ‘Public Acceptability of Data
Sharing between the Public, Private and Third Sectors for Research Purposes’ Scottish Government Social Research
(2013) <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00435458.pdf>.
3 There is reason to believe that the public are willing to accept access to conﬁdential health information for
secondary purposes without explicit consent as appropriate, if certain conditions are met, even if this
would not be their preference. See M.J. Taylor and N. Taylor ‘Health Research Access to Personal Conﬁ-
dential Information in England and Wales: Assessing Any Gap in Public Attitude between Preferable and
Acceptable Models of Consent’, (2014) 10(15) Life Sciences, Society and Policy <http://www.lsspjournal.
com/content/10/1/15>.
4 Information Governance Review, Information: To Share or Not to Share (March 2013), 87.
5 A concern that has been recognised by the courts. See, e.g. X Health Authority v Y [1988] 2 ALL ER 648;
H (a Healthworker) v Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2002] EWCA civ 195; R (on the application of Sue Axon)
v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), [7].
6 Department of Health Conﬁdentiality: NHS Code of Practice (November, 2003), 11.
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across different professionals regarding the relevant legal basis of any data ﬂow, it is
impossible to be consistently clear about the applicable safeguards and controls. A
lack of clarity and consistent transparency compromises opportunities to let people
know what to expect and undermines any ability to provide assurance that data will
only be used for purposes that persons have reason to accept.
In England and Wales, not only the need for ‘a more transparent dialogue’7 has been
recognised, but the need for increased clarity and consistency of message is also currently
being felt here particularly keenly.8 This article responds to the call for improved clarity
regarding the legal bases for disclosure of conﬁdential patient data for public health pur-
poses. It articulates reasons for reliance upon speciﬁc parts of the Health Service
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 to justify disclosure of conﬁdential
patient information for different public health purposes. In particular, it suggests that a
distinction should be drawn between different parts of the regulations, namely Regula-
tions 3 and 5, according to whether processing is for the purposes of public health protec-
tion or public health improvement. More clearly, aligning disclosure of conﬁdential patient
data for particular public health purposes with particular parts of the 2002 Regulations
will promote greater uniformity in the application of controls and safeguards associated
with the disclosure for these different kinds of public health purposes.
Further, the argument advanced is that a relatively narrow interpretation of Regula-
tion 3, which would restrict it to purposes of public health protection, continues to be
more consistent with the original intention behind the 2002 Regulations and broader
principles of statutory interpretation. What is more, this interpretation—which would
see Regulation 5 as the more appropriate basis for disclosure for the purposes of
public health improvement—will better meet requirements under human rights legisla-
tion. A separate but related point is that it also importantly opens the space to realise
the deliberative potential of discussion by the independent group that advises on the
application of Regulation 5. None of this is to suggest that it may not be appropriate
to disclose for the purposes of public health improvement under the 2002 Regula-
tions. Rather, it implies that (1) there is a need to be clear whether, and if so when,
disclosure for the purposes of public health improvement may be under Regulation 3
or 5, and (2) there are reasons to prefer disclosure for the purposes of public health
improvement under Regulation 5. This discussion takes place in the shadow of a
bigger discussion about the future of EU Data Protection. Without wanting to
confuse a discussion of data protection law with the purpose and effect of the 2002
Regulations (which is essentially concerned with setting aside the Common Law
7 The need for a more transparent dialogue regarding existing and potential uses of patient data for second-
ary purposes has also been recognised in the USA. See, C. Safran, M. Bloomrosen, W. E. Hammond, S.
Labkoff, S. Markel-Fox, P. C. Tang, and D. E. Detmer, ‘Toward a National Framework for the Secondary
Use of Health Data: An American Medical Informatics Association White Paper’ (2007) January–Febru-
ary; 14(1) J Am Med Inform Assoc 1–9 <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2329823/>;
also, the Canadian academies are currently conducting a review of best practices in health- and social-care
data sharing: <http://www.scienceadvice.ca/en/assessments/in-progress/health-data.aspx>.
8 Concerns about the consequences of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and the extended powers of
the Health and Social Care Information Centre, led inter alia to the establishment of the pressure group
‘MedConﬁdential’ <http://medconﬁdential.org/>. MedConﬁdential are campaigning for the ‘consensual,
safe and transparent’ ﬂow of data into, across, and out of the NHS.
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Duty of Conﬁdence), it is worth noting that some versions of proposed text for a
future EU Data Protection Regulation may prevent some of the disclosures being
described here.9 Clarifying the safeguards around such disclosures, demonstrating
how they can take place with appropriate protection of individual privacy, may offer
support to arguments that preventing such disclosures is not necessary to achieve
appropriately robust protection.
I I . DISCLOSING CONFIDENTIAL PATIENT INFORMATION FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH PURPOSES
In England and Wales, the use of conﬁdential patient data is subject to a complex
matrix of legal requirements. In addition to the requirements of the Data Protection
Act 1998, which are not the focus of this article,10 there are duties owed under the
Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence. Under English Law, it is clear that despite any
Duty of Conﬁdence that may be owed in relation to patient data, there may be a legal
basis for processing conﬁdential patient information for public health purposes. The
Health Protection (Notiﬁcation) Regulations 2010 set aside the common law duties
by a statutory duty imposed on registered medical practitioners to notify certain speci-
ﬁed infectious diseases and contaminations to the proper ofﬁcer of the local authority
via Public Health England (PHE). In addition, diagnostic laboratories are required to
provide positive diagnostic test results on speciﬁed diseases to PHE. Furthermore, the
common law duties may be set aside under the Health Service (Control of Patient Infor-
mation) Regulations 2002 (hereafter ‘the 2002 Regulations’). What needs to be clearer
is which parts of the 2002 Regulations can be relied upon under which circumstances.
Regulation 3 of the 2002 Regulations can set aside the restrictions speciﬁcally asso-
ciated with the Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence when processing is intended to diag-
nose, control, prevent, or recognise trends in ‘communicable diseases and other risks to
public health’ (emphasis added). Other parts of the 2002 Regulations, including a more
generally applicable Regulation 5, can set aside the common law restrictions in other cir-
cumstances. Regulations 3 and 5 have different controls and safeguards associated with
them. Consistent understanding of the scope of the phrase ‘other risks to public health’
is necessary for consistent description of the controls and safeguards that will apply to
disclosure for different public health purposes. A narrow reading of ‘other risks to
9 M. Taylor and B. Thompson ‘Update on the European Data Protection Regulation’ (Brieﬁng Paper,
(2013) [38], available from <http://p3g.org/programmes/elsi-20>.
10 Any disclosure of conﬁdential patient information must be consistent with the requirements of the Data
Protection Act 1998. As long as data are processed in ways consistent with the data protection principles
set out in Part I, Schedule 1, of the 1998, there is nothing in the Data Protection Act 1998 from preventing
the disclosure or other processing of conﬁdential patient data for public health purposes without patient
consent. Conﬁdential patient information, so far as it relates to the living, will be ‘sensitive personal data’.
It will, therefore, be necessary (in order to satisfy the ﬁrst data protection principles of ‘fair and lawful’ pro-
cessing) to satisfy at least one of the conditions set out in Schedule 2 and at least one of the conditions set
out in Schedule 3 of the 1998 Act. A Schedule 2 condition can be satisﬁed by demonstrating that the
processing is necessary for the ‘exercise of any function of a public nature exercised in the public interest
by any person’ [5(d)] or is necessary ‘for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data
controller . . . except where the processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to
the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject’ [6(1)]. A Schedule 3 condition can be
satisﬁed by demonstrating that the processing is necessary for medical purposes and is undertaken by a
health care professional or person owing an equivalent duty of conﬁdence (8).
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public health’ to date—restricting it to health protection—has undoubtedly placed
restrictions on the ﬂow of data for public health purposes. Prompted by the most
recent Caldicott2 report, the current position is being reviewed by PHE.11
One of the reasons that a narrow reading of Regulation 3 places restrictions on the
ﬂow of data for public health purposes is that disclosure under Regulation 5 is asso-
ciated with independent review by an advisory group. A standard requirement
imposed by the group is that individual objection to disclosure should be respected in
all but the most exceptional circumstances.12 Both independent review and the possi-
bility for individual opt-out are safeguards that, in the context of research use at least,
have been described as relevant to the acceptability of the disclosure of conﬁdential
patient data without patient consent.13 They may also constitute ‘warrants of trust’
relevant to ensuring that activity does not extend beyond that which has ‘social
license’ irrespective of strict legal authority.14 That is to say, the safeguards associated
with Regulation 5 may be relevant to the maintenance of public conﬁdence in the dis-
closure of conﬁdential patient information, without patient consent, for purposes of
improving public health. There may be sound regulatory reasons for preferring reli-
ance upon Regulation 5, particularly when addressing those applications of the 2002
Regulation likely to be the most controversial. While these are important points and I
will return to them at the end, they are at best supplemental to the legal argument for
preferring a narrow interpretation of Regulation 3. Before unpacking the argument in
terms of legal rationality, however, it is necessary to say a little more about the legal
context in which the 2002 Regulations operate and to explain the need for clarity
regardless of which interpretation of Regulation 3 is eventually to be preferred.
A. The Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence and Public Health
The records of patients in England and Wales are not held centrally by the National
Health Service (NHS). Instead, the various parts of the NHS hold their own records
of patient care and treatment. Records are held separately by the General Practitioner
(GP),15 NHS Hospital, NHS dentist, and many other providers of specialist, publicly
funded or privately paid for patient care and treatment. Each of the health-care
11 See open letter to Chief Executive, Director of Public Health from Prof. John Newton, CKO, Public
Health England, 24 May 2013.
12 HRA CAG Principles of Advice (April 2013), 1.4.1, 6 <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2013/09/
v-2_principles_of_advice_-_april_2013.pdf> accessed 9 December 2014.
13 Independent review and individual opt-out were two of the safeguards described by patients in relation to
research use of their data as reasons for accepting a model of consent, e.g. opt-out, other than that which
might be their preference. See M.J. Taylor and N. Taylor ‘Health Research Access to Personal Conﬁdential
Information in England and Wales: Assessing Any Gap in Public Attitude between Preferable and Accept-
able Models of Consent’ (2014) 10(15) Life Sciences, Society and Policy <http://www.lsspjournal.com/
content/10/1/15>. While that study was focussed upon research rather than public health, it may be
expected that these safeguards might also have the advantage of supporting public conﬁdence in appropri-
ate processing.
14 M. Dixon-Woods, P. Carter, and G. Laurie ‘The Social Licence for Research: Why Care.data Ran into
Trouble’ J Med Ethics doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102374 <http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2015/
01/23/medethics-2014-102374.short?g=w_jme_top10_tab>.
15 A GP would traditionally have been the ‘family doctor’. Although the service and role of the GP have
changed over the years, it remains the case that most NHS patients will be registered with a GP who will
typically act as a ﬁrst point of contact, advice, and specialist referral in all but emergency situations.
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professionals operating within these different organisations owes a duty of conﬁdenti-
ality to his or her patients.16 This duty to protect identiﬁable patient data is rooted in
professional ethics as well as common law.17 This duty protects patients from the
inappropriate sharing of the conﬁdential patient data and is generally to be regarded
as a good thing. However, there have been concerns expressed in England that the
controls applied to protect patient conﬁdence can also inhibit the appropriate sharing
of patient data. This concern has been expressed in relation to sharing for both direct
care and secondary use (also known as indirect care) purposes.18
Stated in general terms, the Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence recognises that
those in receipt of conﬁdential patient information are under a duty to hold and dis-
close that information in ways that respect a patient’s ‘reasonable expectations of
privacy’.19 This is typically interpreted to mean that
information that can identify individual patients, must not be used or disclosed
for purposes other than healthcare without the individual’s explicit consent,
some other legal basis, or where there is a robust public interest or legal justiﬁ-
cation to do so.20
While this may be a defensible position in both law and principle, it is not always
clear exactly what it requires in practice: There have been few cases considering the
outer limits to the uses of information supportable on the basis of a consent to
receive healthcare. For example, does an explicit consent to healthcare imply also that
one consents to the use of identiﬁable information to audit the care or treatment
received?21 Generally, the lack of precedent describing the distinction between
16 See NHS England Conﬁdentiality Policy (NHS England, June 2014) <http://www.england.nhs.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2013/06/conf-policy-1.pdf>; Department of Health Conﬁdentiality: NHS Code of
Practice (7 November 2003) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conﬁdentiality-nhs-code-of-
practice>.
17 It has been established that the duty only extends to identiﬁable data, see R v Dept of Health, ex p Source
Informatics [2000] 1 All ER 786.
18 This has been expressed most recently in the context of sharing support care [see Information Governance
Review Information: to share or not to share (March 2013)], but there has been a long-standing concern
within the research community that information governance can be a disproportionate impediment to
appropriate health research. See, for example, Academy of Medical Sciences, A New Pathway for the Regula-
tion and Governance of Health Research (January 2011) and also Academy of Medical Sciences, Personal
Data for Public Good: Using Health Information in Medical Research (January 2006) <http://www.acmedsci.
ac.uk/viewFile/publicationDownloads/newpathw.pdf>.
19 Campbell vMGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22, [22] per Lord Nicholls;W v Edgell [1989] EWCACiv 13.
20 Department of Health, Conﬁdentiality: NHS Code of Practice (November 2003), p7 <https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/conﬁdentiality-nhs-code-of-practice>. Although one should note that in R (on
the application of W, X, Y, and Z) v The Secretary of State for Health v The Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2014] EWHC 1532 (Admin) Mr Justice Silber in the High Court found that the disclosure
of identifying information, if omitting details of an individual’s illness or medical history, may not be conﬁ-
dential. Detailed analysis of this decision is not necessary for the purposes of the argument offered here
because disclosure for public health purposes will invariably require disclosure of some clinically signiﬁcant
information alongside the detail enabling an individual’s identiﬁcation.
21 A rather pragmatic distinction is currently drawn in practice between a local clinical audit that is conducted
by those that provide a patient’s care and those that support them, and an audit, e.g. a national audit, that
requires the disclosure of conﬁdential patient information outside of an organisation. See GMC
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reasonable and unreasonable expectations in this context can leave professionals
understandably unclear on the boundaries between permitted sharing and unlawful
disclosure. Reluctant to risk breaching any duty, the uncertainty can encourage a cau-
tious approach.22 Just as the limits of implied consent are unclear, so the range of dis-
closures permissible due to a ‘robust public interest’ is not clearly deﬁned.
The Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence is rooted in the idea of ‘the public interest’.
There is recognised to be a public interest (and not merely a private interest) in the
preservation of an individual’s right to conﬁdence.23 However, at times, the public
interest may require the disclosure of conﬁdential information.24 The courts have
been willing to support the unauthorised disclosure of conﬁdential information to
protect the public from a risk of harm. When balancing competing interests in the par-
ticular circumstances that gave rise to the case of W v Edgell,25 Lord Bingham found
there to be one consideration that
weighs the balance of public interest decisively in favour of disclosure. It may be
shortly put. . . A consultant psychiatrist who becomes aware, even in the course
of a conﬁdential relationship, of information which leads him, in the exercise of
what the court considers a sound professional judgment, to fear that such deci-
sions may be made on the basis of inadequate information and with a real risk
of consequent danger to the public is entitled to take such steps as are reason-
able in all the circumstances to communicate the grounds of his concern to the
responsible authorities.26
Having identiﬁed a ‘real risk of consequent danger to the public’, the court found
the public interest lay in Dr Edgell taking ‘reasonable steps’ to disclose conﬁdential
patient information contrary to his patient’s expressed wish.27 The risk present need
not to be associated with criminal activity or some other kind of misconduct.28 In
Conﬁdentiality: Guidance for Doctors (October 2009), 13–14. It should be noted that in either case, the
NHS Code of Practice on Conﬁdentiality states that it ‘extremely important that patients are made aware
of information disclosures that must take place in order to provide them with high quality care. In particu-
lar, clinical governance and clinical audits, which are wholly proper components of health care provision,
might not be obvious to patients and should be drawn to their attention’. Ibid, p7.
22 Doctors are encouraged to inform patients with whom they will be sharing conﬁdential information, even
for care purposes, in order to avoid surprises and to ensure that any patient consent is appropriately
informed. GMC Conﬁdentiality: Guidance for Doctors (October 2009), 12; The ‘culture of caution’ around
data sharing and linkage is further discussed by N. Sethi and G. Laurie ‘Delivering Proportionate Govern-
ance in the Era of eHealth’ Medical Law International (June 2013) 13(2–3), 168–204.
23 X Health Authority v Y [1988] RPC 379.
24 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109, per Lord Goff of Chieveley at
p282.
25 [1989] EWCACiv 13.
26 SeeW v Edgell [1989] EWCACiv 13 per Lord Bingham at p424 [E–G].
27 In that case, it was the judgment of both Sir Stephen Brown (p416 [E]) and Lord Bingham (p421[E])
(agreed by Sir John May) that the disclosure fell within the circumstances of paragraph 81(g) set out in
the then current edition of the GMC’s ‘Blue Book’: ‘Rarely, disclosure may be justiﬁed on the ground that
it is in the public interest which, in certain circumstances such as, for example, investigation by the police
of a grave or very serious crime, might override the doctor’s duty to maintain his patient’s conﬁdence.’
cited by Lord Bingham at p421 [E].
28 Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 Q.B. 349, 362 (per Lord Denning).
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Malone v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2), Sir Robert Megarry offered
a relevant example:
There may be cases where there is no misconduct or misdeed but yet there is a
just cause or excuse for breaking conﬁdence. The conﬁdential information may
relate to some apprehension of an impending chemical or other disaster, arising
without misconduct, of which the authorities are not aware, but which ought in
the public interest to be disclosed to them.29
One can imagine a scenario in which, faced with an impending chemical disaster
and a real risk of consequent danger to the public, any court required ‘to carry out a
balancing operation between the public interest in maintaining conﬁdence and the
public interest in disclosure’30 would consider the balance to be ﬁrmly tipped towards
disclosure. However, that scenario may be considered to be towards one end of a par-
ticular spectrum. It is difﬁcult to anticipate precisely where the courts will ﬁnd the
tipping point in the face of different kinds of risk to public health. Risks themselves
may vary according to magnitude, immediacy, and agency. Effective mitigation of risk
may also varyingly depend upon different levels of disclosure, of different types of
information of different levels of sensitivity, to different numbers of persons in differ-
ent roles for different reasons. While we might anticipate that the courts support for
limited disclosure to protect the public from ‘impending disaster’, would they support
routine and widespread disclosure of sensitive data to undertake surveillance or plan-
ning for more common risks? The 2002 Regulations were, at least in part, a response
to this lack of clarity regarding when public health-related activity could meet the
common law thresholds for public interest disclosure.
In response to a concern that certain speciﬁc activities may not be carried out in
ways that meet responsibilities under the Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence, Parlia-
ment introduced a power to allow the Secretary of State (SofS) to introduce Regula-
tions to set aside the Common Law Duty in certain circumstances. In debate, Lord
Hunt (Parliamentary under SofS for Health) described those Regulations as essen-
tially in two parts, with the ﬁrst part having two speciﬁc areas as its focus:
The ﬁrst part outlines two speciﬁc areas of work that require access to patient-
identiﬁable information where, through consultation and consideration by the
independent Patient Information Advisory Group, it has been demonstrated that
common law requirements for consent cannot currently be met. The two areas are:
the work carried out by cancer registries to monitor the incidence of cancer and
measure mortality and survival rates; and work to tackle risks to public health such
as the communicable disease surveillance and prevention undertaken by the Public
Health Laboratory Service and other contributing agencies.31
29 [1979] 344 Chancery, 183.
30 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109, per Lord Goff of Chieveley at
282.
31 HL Deb, 21 May 2002, Vol. 635 cc725–58, 727 (emphasis added).
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B. Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002
The Regulations that made speciﬁc provision for disclosure for these areas of work
were the Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002. These
Regulations allow for Conﬁdential Patient Information32 to be disclosed, without
patient consent, for deﬁned medical purposes, including the speciﬁc support offered
(under Regulation 2) to cancer registration and (under Regulation 3) to public health
purposes. In addition, in the second part mentioned earlier but not fully described,
the 2002 Regulations permit (under Regulation 5) disclosure for medical purposes
more broadly deﬁned. The scope of each of these Regulations must be interpreted
not only taking the objectives of the instrument as a whole into account, but they
must also be read together. The interpretation of each must be undertaken with a
thought to the extent to which the other may represent an alternative (and preferable)
way of achieving appropriate support for the relevant medical purpose.
In what follows, the content of Regulation 3 in particular will be analysed with a
view to clearly setting out (i) the nature of the public health purposes that may be
appropriately brought within its scope and (ii) to whom conﬁdential data might be
disclosed for these purposes. This is not to say that this will describe the limits of
appropriate disclosure, in terms of either scope or recipient, for public health pur-
poses. There remains the possibility that disclosure for public health purposes, for
purposes and to persons not within the scope of Regulation 3, may be brought within
the scope of the more general Regulation 5, or some other statutory basis for disclos-
ure, or alternatively, justiﬁed as appropriate given an overriding ‘public interest’ in dis-
closure. Despite the importance of Regulation 2 and cancer registration, this will not
be further considered here, although it is important to note that not all of the work of
PHE needs to be brought within either Regulation 3 or 5.
The advantage of reliance upon a statutory provision, such as either Regulation 2,
3, or 5, is that there is the opportunity for prospective clarity on the appropriateness of
disclosure of particular kinds. This opportunity, and its associated beneﬁts, can,
however, only be realised fully if there is uniform understanding of the scope of the
support offered by statute. Here, this includes understanding the limits of both
purpose and persons that may rely on Regulation 3 and the implications for potential
reliance upon Regulation 5. Clarity regarding the breadth of Regulation 3 is important
to describe the controls and safeguards that attach not only to disclosure for particular
kinds of purpose but also to particular classes of person. The corollary is greater
clarity regarding the controls and safeguards attached to disclosure for particular pur-
poses, to particular persons, under Regulation 5.
32 Conﬁdential patient information is a sub category of patient information. The National Health Service Act
2006 deﬁnes patient information as ‘(a) information (however recorded) which relates to the physical or
mental health or condition of an individual, to the diagnosis of his condition or to his care or treatment,
and (b) information (however recorded) which is to any extent derived, directly or indirectly, from such
information, whether or not the identity of the individual in question is ascertainable from the information’
[s251(10)]. Patient information is ‘conﬁdential patient information’ where ‘(a) the identity of the individ-
ual in question is ascertainable (i) from that information, or (ii) from that information and other informa-
tion which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the person processing that
information, and (b) that information was obtained or generated by a person who, in the circumstances,
owed an obligation of conﬁdence to that individual’ [s251(11)].
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C. Regulation 3: Communicable Disease and Other Risks to Public Health
Subject to a number of qualiﬁcations to be considered presently, Regulation 3 of the
2002 Regulations provides a lawful basis for the disclosure of conﬁdential patient
information notwithstanding any Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence that might be
owed. The Regulations establish a secure legal basis for a health professional to
disclose conﬁdential patient information for the purposes of
(a) diagnosing communicable diseases and other risks to public health;
(b) recognising trends in such diseases and risks;
(c) controlling and preventing the spread of such diseases and risks;
(d) monitoring and managing
(i) outbreaks of communicable disease;
(ii) incidents of exposure to communicable disease;
(iii) the delivery, efﬁcacy, and safety of immunisation programmes;
(iv) adverse reactions to vaccines and medicines;
(v) risks of infection acquired from food or the environment (including
water supplies);
(vi) the giving of information to persons about the diagnosis of
communicable disease and risks of acquiring such disease.
The conﬁdential information must be disclosed to, and processed by, one of a
limited number of persons or bodies listed in paragraph 3 of Regulation 3:
(a) by a public body that has responsibility, as an executive agency of the
Department of Health, for public health;
(b) by persons employed or engaged for the purposes of the health service; or
(c) by other persons employed or engaged by a Government Department or
other public authority in communicable disease surveillance.
Unlike other parts of the 2002 Regulations, Regulation 3 does not require a further
decision [by the SofS or the Health Research Authority (HRA)] before it can serve as
a lawful basis for disclosure. Put formally, if persons within the scope of paragraph 3
are to process conﬁdential patient information for purposes within the scope of para-
graph 2, then Regulation 3 provides a secure legal basis for the disclosure of conﬁden-
tial patient information to those persons for those purposes. The precise scope of
both paragraphs 2 and 3, and their interaction, is thus a crucial determinant of the
extent of the exception to the general requirement for patient consent that is carved
out by Regulation 3 for public health purposes. It has implications for the conﬁdenti-
ality of all patients with records held in England and Wales.
The focus of the argument offered in this article is on the interpretation and scope of
just one phrase in paragraph 2: ‘other risks to public health’. However, due to the signiﬁ-
cance of the interaction between paragraphs 2 and 3, it is relevant context that the list of
persons or bodies in paragraph 3 covers a potentially very broad class of persons. In fact,
given the nature and arrangement of the comprehensive health service in England and
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Wales today, and the fact that private companies are regularly contracted to provide ser-
vices to support the delivery of different aspects of care or treatment, the inclusion within
sub-paragraph (b) of persons ‘employed or engaged for the purposes of the health service’
might potentially be very inclusive indeed. It gives rise to a distinct possibility that conﬁ-
dential patient data might be disclosed, for public health purposes, to any party ‘engaged
for the purposes of the health service’. This might include private commercial companies.
Given current concern over disclosure of conﬁdential patient information to companies
that might use that data, even partly for commercial purposes, this is an additional reason
to be clear on what processing is permissible within the scope of paragraph 2.33
Before turning to consider in more detail the text of paragraph 2, and in particular
to ask what public health processing might be brought within the phrase ‘other risks
to public health’, there is a separate part of Regulation 3 that deserves brief mention:
paragraph 4. This paragraph is worthy of mention at this point not only because it is
part of Regulation 3, albeit offering a less trodden path towards lawful data processing
than other parts of Regulation 3, but also because it engages safeguards against arbi-
trary processing that will feature in later analysis and do not otherwise apply to Regula-
tion 3. Under 3(4), where it is considered necessary, the SofS may give notice to any
body or person speciﬁed in paragraph 2 to require that person or body to process
information. There is no record of this paragraph having ever been invoked. However,
were it to be relied upon, then—because it would require express decision by the
SofS—the use of Regulation 3(4) would be informed by independent advice.
I I I . THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP
There is an independent advisory group with responsibility for advising on the appli-
cation of the 2002 Regulations. The group has, with changes in the law, been
renamed a number of times through its history. Despite changes, it has existed in
some form since it was ﬁrst called upon to give advice when the Regulations were ori-
ginally drafted, and it has always had a diverse membership with both expert and lay
members. When ﬁrst created, the group was known as the Patient Information Advis-
ory Group (PIAG). It now operates as a committee of the HRA and is known as the
Conﬁdentiality Advisory Group (CAG). In the interim, it was a committee of the
National Information Governance Board for Health and Social Care (NIGB), and
known as the Ethics and Conﬁdentiality Committee (ECC). Unless referring to a spe-
ciﬁc piece of historic advice, I will use the generic term the Advisory Group.
The terms of reference of the Advisory Group have changed over the years. Origin-
ally, there was a statutory responsibility to consult the Advisory Group before new or
amended Regulations were laid before Parliament,34 but when NIGB was abolished,
33 This concern has been expressed, inter alia, by the House of Commons Health Select Committee, in rela-
tion to disclosures by the NHS Information Centre of patient level (though not identiﬁable) data to com-
mercial companies. See, for example, House of Commons Health Committee, Oral evidence: Handling
NHS patient data, HC 484 (Tuesday 1 July 2014), Q438 <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/health-committee/handling-of-nhs-patient-data/oral/11192.
html>.
34 The responsibility to consult the PIAG was originally contained in S61 of the Health and Social Care Act
2001. The responsibility to consult NIGB was under Section 252 of the National Health Service Act 2006
prior to amendment.
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this responsibility transferred to the Care Quality Commission and that is where this
particular responsibility currently rests.35 The Advisory Group has, however, always
been invited to advise decision-making under the 2002 Regulations. The Care Act 2014
has, for the ﬁrst time, created a statutory responsibility to establish a committee for the
purposes of giving such advice to decision makers. This would include, but not be
limited to, any decision to rely upon Regulation 3(4). The Care Act 2014 requires the
HRA to establish a committee for the purposes of giving advice in circumstances where a
decision has to be made on whether to permit processing under the 2002 Regulations.36
If there is an application to use conﬁdential patient information for research purposes,
then the advice is given to the HRA. If for non-research purposes, then it is the SofS.
This is why the Advisory Group now has a role advising SofS in relation to Regulation 3
(4) but not other parts of Regulation 3: Regulation 3 relates to a non-research purpose,
and 3(4) is the only part of Regulation 3 that requires a decision by the SofS. As already
stated, if conﬁdential patient information is to be used for the purposes, and by the
persons, described in Regulation 3, so long as 3(4) is not to be relied upon, then such
persons may rely upon Regulation 3 without making application to CAG to advise SofS.
In contrast to the position under Regulation 3, any use of Regulation 5 requires a
decision before the Common Law Duty of Conﬁdence can be set aside and conﬁden-
tial patient information disclosed, without patient consent, for medical purposes.
Whether the decision is by the HRA or SofS depends upon whether the application is
for a research or non-research use. Any person wishing to establish support under
Regulation 5 for particular processing will submit an application to the Advisory
Group. The Advisory Group will then provide advice to the relevant decision maker.
The application to the Advisory Group will set out the speciﬁc purposes of process-
ing, the justiﬁcation for that processing in terms of improved patient care or public
interest and, inter alia, why the objective of the processing could not be achieved
without reliance upon the Regulations, e.g. through the use of only effectively anon-
ymized data or with patient consent.37
Regulation 5 can be used to permit processing for any medical purpose in any of
the circumstances set out in Schedule 1 to the 2002 Regulations. Medical purpose is
broadly deﬁned to include the purposes of any of the following: ‘preventative medi-
cine, medical diagnosis, medical research, the provision of care and treatment and the
35 See S252 NHS Act 2006 as amended.
36 ‘The HRA must appoint a committee for the purpose of giving advice—(a) to the HRA in connection
with the exercise of the HRA’s function under regulation 5(1)(a) of the Health Service (Control of Patient
Information) Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/1438) (approval for processing conﬁdential patient informa-
tion); (b) to the Secretary of State in connection with the exercise of the Secretary of State’s functions
under regulations 2, 3(4) and 5 of those Regulations (processing of conﬁdential patient information)’,
paragraph 8(1), Schedule 7.
37 A pre-application check list setting out the kinds of things that are taken into consideration by the Advisory
Group is available on the HRA website. See, in particular questions 6–11 that are intended to ‘reﬂect the
minimum legal criteria set out in legislation’ HRA CAG, ‘CAG Pre Application Decision Tool’ (HRA,
undated) <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2013/08/cag-pre-application-decision-tool.pdf> (last
accessed 28 July 2013). There is also a document setting out some of the principles that guide the advice
given HRA CAG ‘Principles of Advice: Exploring the concepts of “Public Interest” and “Reasonably Prac-
ticable”’ (Improvement Programme Series of Papers, April 2013) <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/
2013/09/v-2_principles_of_advice_-_april_2013.pdf>.
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management of health and social care services’.38 A number of equally broadly
deﬁned circumstances are set out in Schedule 1 to the Regulations, and they include
processing conﬁdential patient information for the purposes of reducing the identiﬁa-
bility of that data; to conduct medical research that requires access to the past or
present geographical location of patients; to identify and contact patients to invite
them to participate in medical research; to link information from more than one
source; and, to audit, monitor, or analyse the provision of patient care and treatment.
Some of the key distinctions between Regulations 3 and 5 may thus be set out in
summary form:
Regulation 3 Regulation 5
Purpose (1) (a) diagnosing communicable
diseases and other risks to public
health; (b) recognising trends in
such diseases and risks; (c)
controlling and preventing the
spread of such diseases and
risks.. . .
Medical purposes: ‘preventative
medicine, medical diagnosis,
medical research, the provision
of care and treatment and the
management of health and social
care services’ (Section 251 NHS
Act 2006).
Recipient (3) (a) by a public body that has
responsibility, as an executive
agency of the Department of
Health, for public health or (b) by
persons employed or engaged for
the purposes of the health service;
or (c) by other persons employed
or engaged by a Government
Department or other public
authority in communicable disease
surveillance.
Any body approved to conduct
the processing by the decision
maker.
Case-by-case
approval
required?
No. Not unless there is to be
reliance upon 3(4).
Yes. Case-by-case decision on
approval following advice from
the Advisory Group.
Approval by
whom
No speciﬁc approval required
(unless under 3(4) in which case
SofS).
Approval by SofS in the case of
non-research medical purposes.
Approval by HRA in the case of
medical research (also requiring
favourable Research Ethics
Committee (REC) opinion).
38 S251(12) NHS Act 2006.
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It is possible for processing for the purposes of public health (within Regulation 3)
to signiﬁcantly overlap with the scope of Regulation 5. For example, the survival ana-
lysis of patients suffering from Clostridium difﬁcile might be regarded as processing for
the purpose of effective ‘provision of care and treatment’ (under Regulation 5) or for
the purposes of ‘recognising trends’ in communicable diseases and other risks to
public health (under Regulation 3). It is important that the interface with Regulation
5 is understood so that applications can be avoided where they would be unneces-
sary.39 Proportionate governance does not require processing for purposes, and by
parties, already agreed by Parliament to be appropriate to continue to be subject to
repeated case-by-case review, advice, and decision. Furthermore, there are different
expectations attached to processing under Regulation 5 as opposed to Regulation 3,
and so it is important that the correct route towards lawful processing is consistently
followed not only for the sake of efﬁciency, and proportionate governance, but also
predictable regulation.40 If the Advisory Group is to appropriately advise on the use of
Regulation 5, then they—and the secretariat that supports their activity and acts as
the primary ﬁlter and source of advice to applicants—will be amongst those that need
to have a consistent and uniform understanding of the scope of Regulation 3.41 The
Advisory Group and their secretariat are not alone in needing this clarity.
Ideally, we require all of those who might potentially receive conﬁdential patient
data for public health purposes, as well as all of those who might potentially disclose
it to them, to have a consistent and uniform understanding of the applicability of the
2002 Regulations. If we want the level of clarity that will enable transparency and con-
sistent public communication and if we want to avoid disproportionate governance
and inconsistent application of the regulatory framework, then we require a clear
source of consistent and uniform advice. It needs to be authoritatively clear which
aspects of the 2002 Regulations can be relied upon to support disclosure to particular
persons for particular public health purposes. Any body within the scope of persons
lawfully entitled to process under Regulation 3, i.e. any of those listed under 3(3),
needs to have an understanding of the scope of the purposes of processing that fall
within 3(2). Not least of all so that they can determine whether it would be appropri-
ate to submit an application to process under Regulation 5. Unfortunately, the lan-
guage of Regulation 3 is far from unambiguous. In particular, there is scope for
different interpretations of the phrase ‘other risks to public health’. What is more, as
the Advisory Group has no standing currently to advise on any part of Regulation 3
[other than 3(4)], it is necessary to look for guidance elsewhere on the meaning and
scope of Regulation 3 and the scope of this phrase. The view historically taken by the
39 In the event, this kind of activity was considered by the ECC to appropriately fall within the scope of Regu-
lation 3, and not Regulation 5, and so an application was not necessary. See discussion relating to survival
analysis of a cohort of C. difﬁcile-infected and non-infected patients admitted to Addenbrooke’s hospital
between 2005 and 2007. ECC Meeting minutes 24 November 2009, p17–18.
40 Proportionate governance is a recurring theme in the Nufﬁeld Council of Bioethics’ ‘The collection,
linking and use of data in biomedical research and health care: ethical issues’ (February, 2015), see espe-
cially 6.44 <http://nufﬁeldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/> See also Sethi and Laurie, Foot-
note 22.
41 Currently, it is PHE who responds to queries regarding whether particular purposes and parties fall within
the scope of Regulation 3.
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Advisory Group, when they did have a broader remit, provides some relevant context
and helps to explain why a relatively narrow interpretation of ‘other risks to public
health’ has been taken for more than 10 years since the Regulations were ﬁrst
drafted.42
A. ‘Other Risks to Public Health’
The Health Protection Agency (HPA) took over the work of the Public Health
Laboratory Service (PHLS) in 2003. At that time, the remit of HPA extended beyond
that of the previous PHLS.43 In particular, the HPA assumed responsibility for chem-
ical and radiological protection issues for which the PHLS had not been responsible.
The PIAG was invited to consider whether the extended remit of the HPA continued
to fall within the scope of Regulation 3. At the time, PIAG recognised that the Regula-
tions were ‘broad enough to support work in these areas’.44 It was evidently the case
that the group considered there to be a sufﬁciently close analogy between the kind of
public health risk posed to a population’s health by communicable disease and that
presented by the environment risks posed by chemical and radiological hazards. That
it needed to be a close analogy in order to be brought within the terms of Regulation 3
is supported by later reﬂection by the Advisory Group on the position previously
taken: ‘PIAG had advised a narrow interpretation of other risks to public health in
relation to Regulation 3, essentially limited to chemical and radiation risks and environ-
ment emergencies’.45
A focus upon chemical and radiological risks and other kinds of environmental
hazard that pose a risk to population health might be described as a focus on public
health protection. In 2011, the Health Select Committee of the House of Commons
said that public health practice is now seen as falling into three distinct domains:
• Health protection, covering interventions to address environmental threats to
the health of the population.
• Health improvement (also referred to as health promotion), embracing a very
wide variety of areas, including tackling health inequalities and addressing
lifestyle issues that impact on health and wellbeing.
• Health-care public health, which is concerned with the quality, safety, efﬁcacy,
effectiveness, value for money, and accessibility of health-care services.46
Each is a serious public health concern, and there will be occasions (e.g. health
screening) when it can be difﬁcult to clearly distinguish into which of these ‘three
42 Under S61(3) of the Health and Social Care Act 2001, there was a general provision permitting the SofS
to ‘seek the views of the Advisory Group on such other matters connected with the processing of patient
information or of any information (other than patient information) obtained or generated in the course of
the provision of the health service as he considers appropriate’.
43 History of the Health Protection Agency 2003–2013: Witness Seminar <http://www.hpa.org.uk/webc/
HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1317138879311>.
44 PIAG meeting minutes, Tuesday 10 June 2003, para. 5.8.
45 CAG minutes, 14 June 2013, 6 (emphasis added).
46 House of Commons Health Committee ‘Public Health’ Twelfth Report of Session 2010–2012 Volume 1:
Report, together with formal minutes, 3, <http://www.publicinformationonline.com/secure/d27128.pdf>.
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distinct domains’ a particular activity falls. Nevertheless, a distinction in principle
between protection and improvement is recognised, and the activity recognised by
PIAG to fall within Regulation 3 can be most closely aligned with the Select Commit-
tee’s description of health protection.47
That the Advisory Group did not interpret Regulation 3 to include health improve-
ment activity is supported by the position that was taken in relation to the activity of
the Public Health Observatories (PHOs). At the same time as the HPA was operating
in England and Wales, there were a series of PHOs also operating. The aims and pur-
poses of PHOs were broader than that of the HPA. PHOs ‘produce information, data
and intelligence of people’s health and health care for practitioners, commissioners,
policy makers and the wider community’.48 The roles of PHO are described by the
Association of PHOs as including ‘monitoring trends in health status and disease;
showing how health inequalities are being tackled; assessing the effects of health care
interventions, giving Commissioners and service providers the evidence and data they
need to reduce inequalities both in access and health outcomes’.49
When the NIGB ECC was asked to consider the appropriateness of PHOs relying
upon Regulation 3:
Discussion with the applicant had identiﬁed that Regulation 3 of the Health
Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, as originally
drafted, had not necessarily taken into account the evolving nature of public
health since their establishment. Members acknowledged that it would stretch
the boundaries of the current Regulations to bring all of the activities contained
within the application within the remit of Regulation 3. The Regulation as ori-
ginally drafted concerned communicable disease and chemical/biological
hazards, and members of the Committee were of the view that PHO activities
were not consistent with the current drafting.50
Although it was recognised that the nature of the boundary between different
kinds of public health activity was evolving, the Advisory Group thought that it would
be to go too far to include all of the activities undertaken by PHOs within the scope
of Regulation 3.
The work of PHOs, screening programmes, and the HPA has now been brought
under the single umbrella of PHE. Need for reliance upon the 2002 Regulations was
reduced when the Health Protection (Notiﬁcation) Regulations 2010 came into force
(which cover laboratory ﬂows), but the 2002 Regulations remain an important legal
basis for disclosure of conﬁdential patient information to PHE, and others, without
patient consent. Now set in statute, the responsibilities of the Advisory Group in rela-
tion to Regulation 3 are, however, also limited to advising on Regulation 3(4), i.e. that
47 Similar distinct domains of public health were also described by the Information Governance Review, Infor-
mation: To Share or Not to Share (March 2013), 85.
48 Association of Public Health Observatories Website <http://www.apho.org.uk/default.aspx?QN=
ABOUT_DEFAULT>.
49 Ibid.
50 ECC minutes 28 September 2010, 10.
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never-used part of the Regulation mentioned earlier, which allows the SofS to require
disclosure of conﬁdential patient information. While no body currently has statutory
responsibility to advise on the appropriateness of reliance upon other elements of
Regulation 3, the processing of conﬁdential patient information for public health pur-
poses was considered as part of the broader Information Governance Review (IGR)
chaired by Dame Fiona Caldicott, which produced what has come to be known as the
Caldicott2 report.
In March 2013, Caldicott2 described how the 2002 Regulations51 provide statutory
support for health-care professionals responsible for health protection to know conﬁ-
dential patient information:
For example, during an outbreak of an infectious disease, public health staff may
need to identify people who are at risk, perhaps because they have not been vac-
cinated, or because they have been exposed to an infectious disease or environ-
mental hazard.52
While Caldicott2 expressed the view that ‘there was a lack of coherence in regula-
tions across the public health arena’, it noted that ‘Health Protection functions are also
largely covered by [the 2002 Regulations] but not wider public health functions, as
there is no immediate risk to other’s health’.53 Caldicott2 did, however, further note
that ‘[t]hose aspects of public health that relate to health of populations should be
reviewed for potential inclusion in Regulation 3 of the Health Service (Control of
Patient Information) Regulations 2002’.54 Moreover, it was a speciﬁc recommenda-
tion of Caldicott2 that:
The Secretary of State for Health should commission a task and ﬁnish group
. . . to determine whether the information governance issues in registries and
public health functions outside health protection and cancer should be covered
by speciﬁc health service regulations.55
The need for clarity on this issue has, therefore, been called for authoritatively.
With the Health and Social Care Act 2012 reconﬁguring the NHS, and local author-
ities gaining additional public health responsibility,56 there is an urgent need for the
review recommended by Caldicott2 and improved clarity on the scope of the existing
Regulations. Indeed, the need for further guidance has also been recognised by PHE.
Since publication of the Caldicott2 report, PHE has undertaken to lead work with the
Department of Health to reduce uncertainty in this area:
51 Alongside the Health Protection (Notiﬁcation) (and related) Regulations 2010.
52 Information Governance Review, 85.
53 Information Governance Review, 87 (emphasis added).
54 Ibid.
55 Recommendation 13; Information Governance Review, 88.
56 Local authorities public health responsibilities (England)—Common Library Standard Note available at
<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/brieﬁng-papers/SN06844/local-authorities-
public-health-responsibilities-england>.
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Public Health England is working with the Department of Health and the
Faculty of Public Health to determine a reasonable interpretation of the phrase
‘other risks to public health’. Further advice will follow once this is resolved.57
The remainder of this article is concerned with considering the legal rules, norms,
or principles that might constrain or inform that interpretive exercise and to argue
that any ambiguity around the scope of ‘other risks to public health’ should be
resolved in a particular way. The conclusion to be offered is that the narrow interpret-
ation favoured by the Advisory Group should continue to be preferred so that disclos-
ure for the purposes of public health improvement might be more appropriately
managed through Regulation 5. The remainder of the article is intended to justify this
conclusion.
IV. INTERPRETING ‘OTHER RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH ’
There are a number of basic principles that inform and guide the interpretation of sta-
tutes. Any ambiguity in the choice of words used to express parliamentary intention
can usually be resolved by reference to the broader legislative context and more
general conventions regarding statutory construction. The courts have been increas-
ingly willing to adopt a ‘purposive’ approach to interpretation rather than rely upon a
literal interpretation of the words used,58 but the fact of certain shared conventions
regarding interpretation helps drafters of legislation to anticipate how courts will
understand the legislation as drafted beyond an expression of purpose alone:
In relation to interpretation of statutory provisions, [ judges] are constrained by
rules of language and more or less well-identiﬁed background presumptions
which condition the way in which it is presumed that Parliament intended a
statute to be read.59
The basic idea that words should be understood within the context ﬁnds speciﬁc
expression in the principle of interpretation known by the Latin expression ‘noscitur a
sociis’: words are known by the company that they keep.60 An example of the applica-
tion of this principle may be seen in the case of Inland Revenue v Frere.61 Here, the
court had to consider the meaning of ‘interest’ in the phrase ‘amount of interest,
annuities or other annual payments’ in the Income Tax Act 1952. The Court held
that short-term interest paid on loans was not tax deductible because other words in
the statute made clear that only annual interest was intended to be deductible, and so
the word ‘interest’ should not be read in a comprehensive sense despite the lack of
57 Open letter to Chief Executive, Director of Public Health from Prof John Newton, CKO, Public Health
England, 24 May 2013. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/council-access-to-health-care-
data-from-the-nhs-letter-from-the-cko>.
58 See R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro Life Alliance) [2003] UKHL 13,
especially [6–10] per Lord Bingham.
59 P. Sales, ‘Judges and Legislature: Values into Law’ Cambridge Law Journal (2012) 71(2), 287–296, at p291.
60 See seminallyMuir v Keay (1874–75) L.R. 10 QB 594.
61 [1964] 3 All ER 796.
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any qualifying adjective in the section.62 In a similar way here, it is suggested that the
phrase ‘other risks to public health’ must be understood within context. One should
not extract the phrase ‘other risks to public health’ and reﬂect in the abstract upon
how far the most comprehensive range of risks to public health might extend. There
may be no ‘qualifying adjective’ attached speciﬁcally to the scope of risks to public
health in the second half of the sub-paragraph, but the fact that the relevant phrase is
‘communicable diseases and other risks to public health’ should be understood to
limit relevant risks to public health to those similar in kind to the risks posed by com-
municable disease. The risks that communicable disease poses to an individual are
environmental risks to a population; they are immediate and serious risks posed by
the external environment to the general public. Protecting people from such risks is a
matter of public health protection and not improvement.
The intent and purpose of a statute may also be drawn from an understanding of
the state of affairs that existed and was known by Parliament to have existed at the
time that it was passed.63 Exceptionally, where ambiguity persists, the courts will take
into account remarks made in Parliament by promoters of a Bill. The background to
the debate surrounding the 2002 Regulations was that the legal basis for the disclosure
of conﬁdential patient information for purposes beyond direct care had come under
scrutiny. A number of activities were found to be without a clear legal basis; and, a
principal aim was to establish a clear legal basis for activity that was already taking
place.64 Within Parliament, in support of the Regulations, it was recognised that if
‘our current surveillance systems are damaged, then there is a real danger of unneces-
sary cases of infectious disease and even deaths’.65 Examples of extant surveillance
systems given included ‘the Public Health Laboratory Service’s work to monitor infec-
tions such as E. coli and new variant CJD’.66 The motivating state of affairs was thus a
risk to existing surveillance systems, which would threaten the ability to provide
adequate health protection (not improvement).
For parliamentary debate to be taken directly into consideration by a court, a
number of conditions originally set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper v Hart
must be satisﬁed. The conditions are, inter alia, (a) the legislation is ambiguous in
some respect, (b) statements by a minister or proposer shed light on the ambiguity,
62 See speech of Viscount Radcliffe, at 427.
63 See Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC
800, 822 per Lord Wilberforce (dissenting). Note that Lord Bingham suggested that this passage ‘may
now be treated as authoritative’ in Quintavalle.
64 ‘For many years, the NHS has been run along paternalistic lines, with managers and clinicians making deci-
sions about what is best for patients with little or no input from patients and their families. . . We need to
bring services in line with the expectations of patients, with the requirements of law and with the high stan-
dards that we have set as our goals. . . But it is important to acknowledge that it will take time to imple-
ment those changes. We cannot simply stop medical research or clinical audit, abandon all the valuable
work on cancer that is underway or leave aside our responsibilities to monitor and sustain public health
while we take time out to build systems and devise ways of working that meet the standards that we now
know should apply. . . So we have to manage change in a way that supports essential activity while the
building blocks for improvement are put in place. We cannot risk some of the most important health
service work programmes grinding to a halt because they are unable at present to meet required stan-
dards...’ HL Deb, 21 May 2002, Vol. 635, cc725–726.
65 Ibid, 727 (emphasis added).
66 Ibid. Note, however, that the monitoring of CJD was in fact undertaken in Scotland and not by PHLS.
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and (c) the statements are clear.67 Each of these conditions may be satisﬁed here.
Statements in the House of Lords by the Health Minister of the day shed light specif-
ically on the ﬂexibility that the ambiguous phrase ‘other risks to public health’ was
intended to allow:
The noble Earl, Lord Howe, raised the issue of why the phrase ‘other public
health risk’ is used in the Regulation. He implied that we needed a tighter deﬁn-
ition. It is, as noble Lords have suggested, impossible to know in advance what
may constitute a risk to public health. The risks that we may face in the future
are often unknowable today. Those working to monitor and safeguard public
health must be free to act quickly and effectively when a new risk is detected.
The alternative is to provide a long list of possible risks that would inevitably
fall behind what is needed.68
It is clear that any ﬂexibility that can be found within the phrase ‘other risks to
public health’ was intended to allow those working to safeguard public health to be
‘free to act quickly and effectively when a new risk is detected’. This is evident in the
case of public health risks posed by communicable diseases, chemical spills, or radi-
ation leaks. There is no similar requirement to act quickly when the risks to public
health are chronic and posed by factors such as obesity, smoking, or the consumption
of alcohol.
While risks to public health posed by chronic environment and lifestyle conditions
might be as signiﬁcant to a population’s health in the long term as the immediate
risks of communicable diseases, chemical, radiological, and biological hazards, etc.,
the immediacy of the threat and the consequent need to react quickly—without
seeking individual patient consent—are qualitatively different. While there are good
reasons to work to improve public health generally, the legal provisions intended to
support public health protection may be designed with different safeguards to those
required to support public health improvement. The necessity and proportionality of
the interference with privacy when conﬁdential patient information is shared for
public health purposes may vary between health protection and health improvement.
This is particularly signiﬁcant when taking into account some of the other legal con-
siderations that will inform and constrain an interpretation of the 2002 Regulations.
A. Human Rights Act 1998
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, courts in the United Kingdom
have been under a statutory obligation to interpret and give effect to all primary and
subordinate legislation, so far as it is possible to do so, in a way that is compatible with
a number of the rights recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).69 One of the Convention rights incorporated into English Law by the
Human Rights Act 1998 is the Article 8 right to a private and family life.
67 See the dicta of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593; [1993] 1 ALL ER 42, 69.
68 HL Deb, 21 May 2002, Vol. 635, cc752.
69 S.3 Human Rights Act 1998.
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Article 8 recognises that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and correspondence’. This right is qualiﬁed by a recognition that
interference with an individual’s enjoyment of the right to a private life may be per-
mitted where it ‘is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society’. It is well established that the disclosure of conﬁdential patient information,
without patient consent, constitutes a prima facie infringement of the right to a
private and family life.70 The question here is whether disclosure for broad public
health purposes could be defended as (i) ‘in accordance with the law’, (ii) in pursuit
of a legitimate aim, and (iii) ‘necessary’ for the purposes of ‘public safety’, ‘the protec-
tion of health or morals’ or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
1. ‘In accordance with the law’
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this phrase to not only require
the interference in question to have some basis in domestic law but also to be compat-
ible with the rule of law:
The law must thus be adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated
with sufﬁcient precision to enable the individual—if need be with appropriate
advice—to regulate his or her conduct. For domestic law to meet these require-
ments, it must afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness and accord-
ingly indicate with sufﬁcient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the
competent authorities and the manner of its exercise.71
If the phrase ‘other risks to public health’ is given a broad reading, assuming other
legal requirements including those imposed by data protection law (discussed in part in
the following) are met, then disclosure could have a basis in domestic law under the
2002 Regulations. However, the broader the permissible reading of ‘other risks’, then the
more discretion conferred on those parties listed in 3(3). The European Court of
Human Rights has found that a ‘law that confers a discretion is not in itself inconsistent
with this requirement, provided that the scope for the discretion and the manner of its
exercise are indicated with sufﬁcient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in ques-
tion, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference’.72
Thus, if protection against arbitrary interference is an aim, it is a relevant consider-
ation that the narrower the permitted reading of ‘other risks to public health’, the
smaller the scope for arbitrary interference and the more substantial the available safe-
guards to protect against arbitrary interference.73 This is because to narrowly interpret
‘other risks’ is not to deny that activity intended to improve (rather than protect)
public health can have a legal basis under the 2002 Regulations. It is only to deny that
70 MS v Sweden (1997) 45 BMLR 133; Z v Finland (1997) 45 BMLR 107.
71 Colon v the Netherlands (2012) 55 EHRR SE5 [72].
72 Hachette Filipacchi Associates v France (2009) 49 EHRR 23, 522–523 [31].
73 There would be the possibility of an action for judicial review if a public body was suspected of applying its
powers in an arbitrary way. There are also certain safeguards contained within Regulation 7 that apply to
Regulation 3. Note that the possibility of judicial review has not been sufﬁcient to persuade the ECtHR
that there is adequate protection from arbitrary exercise of power (See Gillan v UK (2010) 50 EHRR 45,
at [80]).
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the basis is Regulation 3. It would remain open for those that wanted to process conﬁ-
dential patient information for the purposes of health improvement to make an appli-
cation to the Advisory Group to do so under Regulation 5. If an application is
submitted for disclosure under Regulation 5, then reasons for the disclosure must be
provided as part of the application, those reasons are subject to independent review,
and the advice on their adequacy is published in the Advisory Group minutes.
Consequently, permitting disclosure for public health improvement purposes
under Regulation 5, rather than Regulation 3, better meets the requirements of the
‘rule of law’. The additional protections associated with decisions to permit disclosure
under Regulation 5 provide protections against arbitrary interference.
2. ‘In pursuit of a legitimate aim’
There is nothing within Article 8(2) of the Convention to limit the nature of the ‘pro-
tection of health’. If ‘other risks’ even given the broadest reading do present a risk to
public health as a matter of fact, then one might argue that disclosure for the purposes
of addressing those risks falls squarely within a speciﬁed legitimate aim. The nature of
the risk, and the need to address it through the particular measures proposed, is
assessed through the tests of necessity and proportionality.
3. ‘Necessary in a democratic society’
As well as in pursuit of a legitimate aim, in order to be consistent with Article 8
ECHR and the requirement that disclosure is necessary in a democratic society, the
reasons for interference must be relevant and sufﬁcient and the interference itself pro-
portionate to the need:74
An interference will be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for a legit-
imate aim if it answers a ‘pressing social need’ and, in particular, if it is propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national
authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and sufﬁcient’.75
The European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) grants member states a certain
margin of appreciation when determining whether an action is ‘necessary’ for the pur-
poses of achieving a legitimate aim. Courts in member states are often considered
best placed to determine whether an interference is necessary,76 and ‘it is therefore
primarily the responsibility of the national authorities to make the initial assessment
as to where the fair balance lies in assessing the need for interference in the public
interest with individuals’ rights under art.8 of the Convention’.77
But, states do not have ‘an unlimited power of appreciation’ and ‘the domestic
margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision’.78 How
74 Handyside v UK (1979–1980) 1 EHRR 737, 753–755.
75 Colon v the Netherlands (2012) 55 EHRR [88].
76 National authorities have direct democratic legitimation, see Hatton v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR
28 at 97; Handyside v UK (1979–80) 1 EHRR 737 at [48].
77 Colon v the Netherlands (2012) 55 EHRR SE5 [87].
78 Handyside v UK (1979–1980) 1 EHRR 737, 754.
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closely the ECtHR will review such decisions will depend upon the subject matter,79
but the proportionality of the interference may be doubted if a less intrusive alterna-
tive could achieve the same objective. In Hatton v United Kingdom (2003), the
ECtHR:
underlined that in striking the required balance States must have regard to the
whole range of material considerations. . . . States are required to minimise, as
far as possible, the interference with Art.8 rights, by trying to ﬁnd alternative
solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in the least onerous way
as regards human rights.80
To reiterate an important point, a narrow reading of Regulation 3 would not
prevent disclosure for the purposes of addressing ‘other risks’ to public health, read
broadly; it would only require consideration of such disclosures under Regulation 5
instead. The ECtHR has established that one of the things that will be especially
material when determining whether a respondent state has remained within their
margin of appreciation is ‘the procedural safeguards available to the individual’.81
Notably, there are more robust procedural safeguards associated with Regulation 5
than with Regulation 3.82 Reliance upon Regulation 5 is subject to case-by-case con-
sideration by either the HRA or the SofS. Any decision on whether to support disclos-
ure would be made with the beneﬁt of independent advice. The minutes of the
Advisory Group are published on the HRA’s website, and they include records of the
deliberations made in relation to all applications and the reasons for the Advisory
Group’s recommendation to the HRA and the SofS. Transparency in relation to pro-
cessing under Regulation 5 is further improved due to the fact that under Regulation
6, any transfer of conﬁdential patient information between persons under Regulation
5 must be recorded in a public register. There is no such requirement in relation to
processing under Regulation 3.
While, therefore, there is no guarantee that a challenge to the Convention compati-
bility of using Regulation 3 would necessarily succeed, there are nonetheless far stron-
ger, defensible reasons to rely on Regulation 5.
V. PATIENT DISSENT AND ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS
If processing were to take place under Regulation 5 rather than Regulation 3, it would
also be subject to any additional conditions that the decision maker attached to that
79 See J. Rivers ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65(1), CLJ 174 and Huang v Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department.
80 Hatton v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 28 [86]. See also paragraphs 86–104, 125, 128, and 129.
81 Connors v UK (2005) 40 EHRR 9 at [83].
82 The application of more robust procedural safeguards may also increase the likelihood that it will be con-
sidered to be consistent with other international norms: ‘Data subjects should be guaranteed the right to
information about the nature and objectives of the data collection, and the methods to be used, as well as
their rights in regard to the data stored and processed subsequent to collection. In particular, and subject
to the existence of other effective safeguards laid down by domestic law, the express and informed consent
of the data subjects should be sought before data can be collected and used’, paragraph ii, Council of
Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(89) 4 on Collection of Epidemiological Data
on Primary Health Care (6 March 1989).
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processing on the recommendation of the Advisory Group. This typically includes the
condition that although consent is not required, any patient dissent to processing
must be respected.83 The use of conﬁdential patient information for indirect care pur-
poses, in the face of express patient objection, will be supported only in the most
exceptional circumstances, e.g. ‘serious public safety concerns’.84 In order to protect
patient trust in the conﬁdentiality of the health service, the Advisory Group has thus
advised respecting dissent in circumstances that go further than the Data Protection
Act 1998 requires.85 The effect of their advice has been to give a patient more control
over the use of his or her information than would otherwise be available under
the law.
There is a right to prevent processing contained within Section 10 of the Data Pro-
tection Act 1998, but the circumstances in which a data controller must respect any
objection to the processing of personal data by a data subject are limited. Section 10
(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 states that an individual is entitled to require a
data controller to cease, or not to begin, processing any personal data of which he or
she is a data subject on the grounds that:
(a) the processing of those data or their processing for that purpose or in that
manner is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial
distress to him or to another, and
(b) that damage or distress is or would be unwarranted.
The condition typically recommended by the Advisory Group requires patient
dissent to be respected in all cases; not only those where processing is causing or is
likely to cause unwarranted substantial damage or substantial distress. Objections moti-
vated by other concerns, i.e. other than concerns for substantial damage or substantial
distress, could not be effectively expressed through Section 10. However, they typic-
ally would be respected if processing were supported under Regulation 5 of the 2002
Regulations.
It is arguably more consistent with recent commitments regarding patient choice86
to restrict a patient’s right to object to processing to the more limited range of circum-
stances set out in Section 10 only when the processing is for the purposes of health
protection rather than improvement. When processing is for the purposes of health
improvement, then it was the view of Caldicott2 that when data were not being used
in an anonymized form, it should be treated like research from an information govern-
ance perspective.87 If data were being processed under the 2002 Regulations for
research purposes, then it would be processed under Regulation 5 (and not Regula-
tion 3) and the additional safeguards, including the requirement that patient dissent is
83 HRACAG ‘Principles of Advice: Exploring the concepts of “Public Interest” and “Reasonably Practicable”’
(Improvement Programme Series of Papers, April 2013), 6 <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2013/
09/v-2_principles_of_advice_-_april_2013.pdf>.
84 Ibid.
85 S251(12) NHS Act 2006.
86 L. Evenstad ‘Hunt pledges to respect patient data’ eHealth Insider 26 April 2013 <http://www.ehi.co.uk/
news/ehi/8549/hunt-pledges-to-respect-patient-data>.
87 Information Governance Review, 86.
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typically respected, would apply. It may also provide additional reassurance that data
were only to be used in ways that individuals would consider appropriate.
The value of the deliberative potential inherent to the operation of the advisory
group should not be underestimated. Recruitment to the group is via open competi-
tion and comprises both expert and lay members with a broad range of experience.
The deliberations of a group with broad-based membership create a pressure to ‘facili-
tate decisions that have the quality of justiﬁability’.88 Members are aware that their
deliberations are recorded in minutes that are publicly accessible. This may promote
the democratic legitimacy of the decision in a way that the structure of Regulation 3
does not allow.89 What is more, when considering whether a proposal is ‘in the public
interest’, the Advisory Group considers that:
as a basic principle, the more readily that one can anticipate acceptance for a pro-
posal across a broad range of ‘user groups’—e.g. if one can anticipate acceptance
not only from those that might beneﬁt from the processing but also those whose
data is to be processed without consent—then the clearer the indication, that the
processing is, at least prima facie, in the public interest. The CAG is thus seeking
to anticipate the ‘reasonable acceptability’ of a proposal by patients and public.90
The suggestion is that independent impartial advice, motivated to apply this
understanding of ‘public interest’, may contribute towards decisions being taken, and
being seen to be taken, for reasons ‘justiﬁable to those affected’.91 It is consistent with
the ambition that we move towards greater consistency, proportionality, and transpar-
ency and that, ultimately, conﬁdential patient data are only used for purposes that
patients have reason to both accept and expect.
VI . CONCLUSION
It is important that we allow ourselves, as a society, to reap the beneﬁts of advances in
information technology and allow ourselves the public health advantages that might
follow the disclosure of conﬁdential patient information for public health analysis.
However, if that disclosure is to be without an individual’s explicit consent, then we
need to be conﬁdent that data only ﬂow on a secure legal basis, with appropriate and
proportionate controls and safeguards, transparently in circumstances that patients
can recognise to be appropriate.
Alternative interpretations of the law result in different safeguards being attached
to disclosure. It is important now to establish the legal bases for disclosure of conﬁ-
dential patient information for different purposes. Without that clarity, we cannot
88 C. Mullen, D. Hughes, and P. Vincent-Jones, ‘The Democratic Potential of Public Participation: Healthcare
Governance in England’ Social & Legal Studies (2011) 20(1), 21–38, 25 <http://sls.sagepub.com/content/
20/1/21>.
89 ‘[D]emocratic legitimacy might be claimed where participation leads to reasoned decisions that are justiﬁ-
able to the public in the relevant constituency’. Ibid, 24–25.
90 HRACAG, ‘Principles of Advice: Exploring the concepts of “Public Interest” and “Reasonably Practicable”’
(Improvement Programme Series of Papers, April 2013), 3 <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2014/
12/principles-advice-april-2013-v-2.pdf>.
91 Mullen, Hughes, and Vincent-Jones, above n 88, 28.
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achieve the relevant transparency and engage in the urgently needed public dialogue
regarding the adequacy of current controls and safeguards and the opportunities asso-
ciated with the use of conﬁdential patient data for purposes beyond direct patient
care. The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002 establish
a legal basis for data to be disclosed for public health purposes without patient
consent. Under the Regulations, there is, however, more than one potential route
towards lawful processing. The alternatives have different safeguards and conditions
attached. There are relative merits and demerits attached to each. If one processes
under Regulation 3, then there is no need to go through the administrative inconveni-
ence and delay of applying for support for that processing. When processing for the
purposes of health protection, the immediacy of the support available has obvious
advantages. Delay could cost lives.
It is equally true that a failure to process information for purposes of health
improvement might also lead to lives being lost. There are chronic and signiﬁcant
health effects attached to various lifestyle and environment factors. Some of these are
beyond individual control. Many of these are experienced disproportionately by
certain sections of society.92 A reduction in inequality, as much as an improvement in
health, requires access to conﬁdential health information for public health purposes.
However, when access is for health improvement purposes, while access itself may be
no less justiﬁed, access under Regulation 3 is not the most appropriate or suitable
legal basis for disclosure without patient consent. There is no justiﬁcation for discard-
ing the additional safeguards associated with processing under Regulation 5. It should
be clear that if conﬁdential patient information is being disclosed for the purposes of
public health improvement, then the most appropriate basis under the 2002 Regula-
tion is Regulation 5. This requires an application to be made to the Independent
Advisory Group and allows for the necessity and proportionality of the interference
with individual privacy to be subject to scrutiny by a panel of persons, expert, and lay,
drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds. The reasons for any recommendation of
support are published within the minutes of Advisory Group meetings, and any dis-
closure, authorised by the SofS for Health, is recorded in a public register. None of
these things need to happen if disclosure is under Regulation 3.
In addition, a narrow interpretation of the phrase ‘other risks to public health’ con-
tained in Regulation 3, restricted to the purposes of health protection, is more consist-
ent with the principle that words should be understood within the context, that
statutes are purposively interpreted consistent with the intentions of parliament, and
that they are read in a way that is consistent with obligations recognised by and
imposed under the Human Rights Act 1998. Access to conﬁdential patient informa-
tion for public health purposes will be more transparent, robust, and deserving of
public conﬁdence if, when individual consent is not practicable, that impracticability
is tested under Regulation 5. As the future of data protection law is now debated, it is
particularly important to demonstrate that it is possible to provide access to identiﬁ-
able information without individual consent and still appropriately protect an indivi-
dual’s right to respect for their private life.
92 HM Government ‘Health Lives, Health People: Our Strategy for Public Health in England’ (November 2010)
(Cmd 7985), esp. p15.
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